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tractual disability to circumvent valid business agreements. To be
sure, such a solution would adequately safeguard the businessman's interests while guaranteeing minors the right to control their
own exposure to commercial exploitation so that a child will not be
left to the caprice of his guardian in the labyrinth of privacy law in
New York. 5
Bernard W. Hylan

COURT OF CLAIMS

ACT

Ct. Cl. Act § 8: In the absence of a special relationshipimposing
a duty of care upon the municipality to a particularplaintiff, the
tect] a person's feelings and right to be let alone." Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F.
Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citations omitted); see N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976). It is submitted that a celebrity such as Shields, who has affirmatively sought
public recognition, would not have been able to demonstrate injury in the present situation.
Thus, it is suggested that the right of disaffirmance would not have been available to her
had a qualified right of disaffirmance been adopted by the Court. Indeed, in Shields v.
Gross, 563 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a case brought by the same plaintiff subsequent
to the Court of Appeals' decision, Shields sought a preliminary injunction in federal court to
restrain the defendant from publishing the same nude prints. Id. at 1253. In refusing to
issue an injunction, Judge Leval held that "[p]laintiff's claim of harm is. . .underinined to
a substantial extent by the development of her career projecting a sexually provocative image." Id. at 1257. The court also noted that the plaintiff's strategy of filing consecutive
claims rather than concurrent suits was inequitable to the defendant who had already been
restrained for over 2 years during the pendency of the state action. Id. at 1255.
65 See Recent Decisions, Civil Rights Law-Invasion of Privacy-Use of Photograph-Murray v. New York Magazine Co., 35 ALB. L. REv. 790, 798 (1971) (describing the
difficulties of separating privacy rights of the individual from the public's right to a free flow
of information as a "quagmire"). Compare Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp.
1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (celebrity musicians garner no protection from section 51 since
their "likenesses" are in the public domain) and Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc.,
498 F. Supp. 401, 404-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (famous actress cannot control faithful reproduction of scene from public performance) with Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 App. Div. 2d 428,
440-42, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1012-13 (1st Dep't 1981) (poster photograph taken during cable
television taping requires model's written consent for publication). The dearth of any logical
development or systematic approach to the right of privacy in New York has been described
as "'still that of a haystack in a hurricane.' "Brinkley, 80 App. Div. 2d at 436, 438 N.Y.S.2d
at 1010 (quoting Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956)). It is submitted that in the resulting morass that is contemporary privacy law in this state, the infant-plaintiff's heretofore unquestioned right of
disaffirmance has been lost. See generally Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH.
L. REV. 777, 777-78 (1980) (analysis of lack of clarity in development of constitutional right
of privacy); Comment, Privacy Tort Law in New York: Some Existing Routes to Recovery,
31 BUFFALO L. REv. 255, 256 (1982) (study of the confusion in New York privacy law).
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municipality remains immune from tort liability
In New York, municipal liability is predicated on a statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity.6 Particularly in the area of tort law,
66 See Court of Claims Act, ch. 467, § 12-a, [1929] N.Y. Laws 994 (current version at

N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963)). Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act provides, in
relevant part:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby
assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with
the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations ....
N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963); see also Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort Liability, 4 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 370-77 (1957) (discussion of New York Court of
Claims Act and the restrictions placed upon it by New York courts). Before waivers of sovereign immunity became prevalent, state and local governments enjoyed absolute immunity
from tort liability. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 970-71 &
nn.5-13 (4th ed. 1971). The concept of absolute sovereign immunity, derived from the ancient axiom "the King can do no wrong," found universal acceptance at common law. Id. at
970; see Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 360 (K.B. 1788); Note, Torts: Municipal Liability: Defects in Planning: Weiss v. Fote, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 366, 367 (1961). This
concept of sovereign immunity did not originally extend to municipalities. In 1845, however,
the Court for the Correction of Errors affirmed a supreme court decision which had held
that immunity extends to a municipality when performing a governmental function, as opposed to a proprietary function. Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531, 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1842), aff'd, 2 Denio 433 (N.Y. 1845); see Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York: A
Legislative Challenge, 23 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 279-80 (1948); see also W. PROSSER, supra, §
131, at 979; Barnett, The Foundationsof the Distinction Between Public and PrivateFunctions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations:The Antecedents of Bailey v. City of New York, 16 OR. L. REv. 250, 257-68 (1937) (Bailey holding
foreshadowed in a number of early English and American decisions). This distinction, which
met with much judicial criticism, was dormant for nearly 30 years, at which time it was
reaffirmed in Maxmilian v. Mayor of New York, 62 N.Y. 160, 170 (1875). The governmental/
proprietary test was never applied to municipal subdivisons, notwithstanding the fact that
such an application would have "resulted in mitigating the injustice of the absolute immunity rule." Lloyd, supra, at 283; see 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 53.02, at 104-05 (rev. 3d ed. 1977). The harsh realities of absolute sovereign immunity
prompted the New York State Legislature to pass laws eliminating such immunity, the final
vestiges of which were abrogated with the enactment of section 8 of the Court of Claims Act.
See Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 604, 605 (1945) (dictum).
Surprisingly, municipal immunity remained initially unaffected by the State's waiver of
immunity. While it was clear that municipal immunity was a derivative of State liability, it
appears that the Legislature did not intend to abrogate municipal immunity with the enactment of section 12-a (now section 8). See Antieau, supra, at 370; Lloyd, supra, at 286-87;
Note, supra, at 368. Instead, municipal immunity was waived in certain causes of action by
the enactment of laws that now are part of article 4 of the General Municipal Law. See
GML §§ 50a-50d, 50j-50k (1977 & Supp. 1982-1983).
Municipal immunity in New York finally terminated in 1945, in the case of Bernardine
v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). In a most influential decision, the
Court of Appeals held that since the City's immunity was an extension of the State's, it
naturally ceased by virtue of section 8 of the Court of Claims Act. Id. at 365, 62 N.E.2d at
605. Additionally, the Court rejected as unnecessary both the governmental/proprietary dis-
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however, remnants of this dormant immunity have been "judicially
resurrected" by requiring litigants who sue the city to establish
that a duty is owed specifically to them, rather than to the public
at large.17 The limitation on municipal liability imposed by this
requirement has the unfortunate side effect of leaving innocent
victims without redress.6 8 Recently, in O'Connor v. City of New
York, 9 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its commitment to this
tinction and the need to proceed against the City under the General Municipal Laws. Id. at
365-66, 62 N.E.2d at 605-06. Thus, municipalities were subject to the same negligence liabilities as private persons and corporations.
67 See Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 178-79, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485, 491
(2d Dep't 1953) (per curiam) (first New York case to apply the special/public duty analysis).
Shortly after the abolition of municipal immunity in Bernardine, there was concern that
unlimited liability would impose a crushing financial burden upon municipalities. Lloyd,
supra note 66, at 292. In response, New York courts fashioned various restrictions, classifications, and conditions in an attempt to restore some immunity. See generally 18 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 66, § 53.03, at 120-21 & nn.3, 5 & 6.
One such classification favored by the New York courts is the special/public duty distinction. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Village of Liberty, 42 N.Y.2d 876, 877-78, 366 N.E.2d 870, 871,
397 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (1977). In order for an injured party to recover against a New York
municipality, a plaintiff must establish the existence of "a special relationship creating a
municipal duty to exercise care for the benefit of a particular class of individuals ... ." Id.;
see also 18 E. McQUILLN, supra note 66, § 53.04b, at 127. A special relationship is created
by the intention of the municipality enacting the statute or ordinance involved. See
Sanchez, 42 N.Y.2d at 878, 366 N.E.2d at 871, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 783. Thus, the injured persons must fall within the class that the municipal duty was intended to benefit. See id.;
Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 178-79, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485, 491 (2d Dep't
1953). Various other classifications have received and continue to receive judicial acceptance. Some examples include: the misfeasance/nonfeasance test, see Milstrey v. City of
Hackensack, 6 N.J. 400, 408, 79 A.2d 37, 41 (1951); the omission standard, see Murrain v.
Wilson Line, Inc., 296 N.Y. 845, 847, 72 N.E.2d 29, 29 (1947) (per curiam); and the legislative-judicial/discretionary act analysis, see 18 E. McQuILLIN, supra note 66, § 53.04a, at 12224. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 895C (1977) (discussing the various
distinctions and their application in case law).
" See Comment, Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspection, 23 Loy. L. REv. 458,
459 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Loyola Comment]. If an injured party fails to fall within the
protected class, recovery will be precluded irrespective of the damages incurred. See, e.g.,
Sanchez v. Village of Liberty, 42 N.Y.2d 876, 877-78, 366 N.E.2d 870, 871, 397 N.Y.S.2d 782,
783 (1977) (fire hazards); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 583, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861,
293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1968) (police protection); Whitney v. City of New York, 27 App. Div.
2d 528, 529, 275 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (1st Dep't 1966) (boiler inspection). In recognition of the
inequities that result from these restrictions, one commentator has stated that "[a]brogation
of the doctrine of municipal governmental immunity [may be] said to merely remove the
defense of immunity, but not to create any new liability for a municipality." 18 E. McQumLAN, supra note 66, § 53.04b, at 126. Various arguments were offered to justify this position,
including public policy considerations. See Leonard, Municipal Tort Liability: A Legislative
Solution Balancing the Needs of Cities and Plaintiffs, 16 URB. L. ANN. 305, 308-09 (1979);
Comment, Municipal Liability for Negligent Building Inspections-Demise of the Public
Duty Doctrine?, 65 IowA L. REV. 1416, 1424 (1980).
69 58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1983).
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rule, holding that absent a special relationship to the plaintiff, a
city is immune from tort liability."°
In O'Connor, a gas explosion ripped through a commercial
building in lower Manhattan causing the death of twelve persons,
injuring many others,7 1 and giving rise to forty-three negligence actions against, inter alia, the City of New York and Consolidated
Edison. 72 Prior to the incident, conversion of part of the building
to a restaurant required installation of additional gas piping and
modification of the existing gas system.73 Pursuant to City regulations, a City inspector was sent to examine the new gas system. 4
Despite the presence of obvious defects,7 5 the inspector issued a
"blue card" authorizing the resumption of gas service. 6 The gas
was turned on 9 days after the inspection.7 7 Shortly thereafter, the
70

Id. at 187, 447 N.E.2d at 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 485.

71 Id.

72 Id. Forty-three actions were instituted against numerous defendants, including the
City of New York, Consolidated Edison (Con Ed), Otto Schlink and Albert Bold, the plumbers responsible for the new installations, and China Dynasty Enterprises, Inc., the owner of
a restaurant in the building. Id. Some of the actions, which were consolidated for trial on
the issue of liability, were dismissed, except as against China Dynasty Enterprises, Inc., a
defunct corporation that had defaulted. Gannon Personnel Agency, Inc. v. City of New
York, 103 Misc. 2d 60, 62, 425 N.Y.S.2d 446, 448 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), reu'd,
O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1983).
" 58 N.Y.2d at 188, 447 N.E.2d at 34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 486. The plans for the new
piping were designed by Con Ed and approved by the City's Department of Buildings. See
103 Misc. 2d at 64, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
7' 58 N.Y.2d at 188, 447 N.E.2d at 34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 486; see NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § C26-1606.1 (1978) (requiring the inspection of alterations of or additions to a
gas piping system, to determine whether code requirements have been complied with).
75 See 58 N.Y.2d at 188, 447 N.E.2d at 34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 486. Prior to the final inspection, the city inspector visited the work site on two separate occasions. Id. At no time
did the inspector complain about the plumber's work. Id. The Court noted that a proper
examination certainly would have revealed open-ended (uncapped) pipe, and the absence of
a shut-off valve required by City regulations. Id. at 189, 447 N.E.2d at 34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at
486; see NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 26, RS-16, § P115.2(a) (1977 & Supp. 1982-1983)
(shut-off valve or stopcock required on every gas service connection). There also was evidence that another gap may have existed in the piping where a new gas meter was to be
installed. 58 N.Y.2d at 188, 447 N.E.2d at 34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
76 58 N.Y.2d at 188, 447 N.E.2d at 34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 486. After a final inspection was
conducted, the inspector informed the plumber that he had done a "good job." Id. The blue
card, issued by an inspector from the Department of Buildings, stated: "[t]his is to certify
that the Gas Pipes of premises known as 7-11 Ann Street in the Borough of Manhattan
conform to the rules and regulations of this Department." Id.
7 Id. at 189, 447 N.E.2d at 34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 486. After presenting the blue card to
Con Edison, the proprietor of the restaurant was informed that a final check of the gas
system was necessary before gas service could begin. Id. The owner, anxious to open the
restaurant for weekend business, however, made other arrangements to have the gas turned
on. Id.
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catastrophic explosion occurred." The lower court, applying traditional concepts of tort liability, held the City liable for the inspector's negligence in improperly issuing the blue card. 79 The decision
was affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department."0
On appeal, a sharply divided Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Appellate Division and dismissed the complaint as
against the City of New York."l Writing for the majority, s2 Chief
Judge Cooke conceded that the City's negligence was indisputable.8 3 Nonetheless, the Court adhered to the well-established New
York rule protecting municipalities from negligence liability absent
a special relationship with the injured party. 4 The Court examined the underlying intention of the inspection regulations and
concluded that they were primarily intended to benefit the general
public.8 5 Recognizing that the plaintiffs were not members of any
78 Id. Shortly after gas service resumed, a strong gas odor was detected, as gas poured
from the open-ended pipe into the basement of the building. Id. Within a short time, the
explosion ensued. Id. Minutes after the mid-afternoon explosion, the entire building was
leveled and scores of unwary shoppers were left injured or dead. 103 Misc. 2d at 62, 425
N.Y.S.2d at 448. In addition, all commercial establishments within the building were obliterated. Id.
7' See 103 Misc. 2d at 78, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 458. The trial court interpreted the State's
waiver of sovereign immunity as imposing liability on municipalities for the torts of its employees, just as corporations and other employers are liable for their employees' torts. Id. at
68-69, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 452. In so doing, the court applied traditional concepts of tort liability, as set forth in the Restatement of Torts:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from
his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 323 (1977); see 103 Misc. 2d at 68-69, 425 N.Y.S.2d at
452.
'0 81 App. Div. 2d 755, 438 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1st Dep't 1981). Although the imposition of
liability was affirmed by the appellate division, the case was remanded for modification of
the judgment on the issue of apportionment of damages. 57 App. Div. 2d at 540, 394
N.Y.S.2d at 7-8.
11 58 N.Y.2d at 192, 447 N.E.2d at 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
02 Chief Judge Cooke wrote the majority opinion in which Judges Jones, Jasen and
Simons concurred. Judges Fuchsberg and Meyer joined Judge Wachtler in his dissenting
opinion.
83 58 N.Y.2d at 189, 447 N.E.2d at 34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 486. The Court unequivocally
acknowledged the inspector's negligence for issuing the blue card since the gas system was
not in conformity with the applicable regulations. Id. Although presumably the Con Ed
inspection could have prevented the explosion, the Court noted that this fact did not mitigate the inspector's negligence. Id.
s' Id., 447 N.E.2d at 34-35, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87; see supra note 67.
85 58 N.Y.2d at 190, 447 N.E.2d at 35, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 487. In the Court's determina-
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special class, and that municipal liability has never been extended
public, the Court declared the City immune from
to the general
liability.8 6
In a cogent dissent, Judge Wachtler advocated the abolition of
what he termed a "judicially created caste system" under which
liability is determined on the basis of a plaintiffs status with respect to a specially protected class.8 7 Since classification schemes
work an unacceptable contravention of basic negligence principles,8 8 Judge Wachtler reasoned that unfair and arbitrary outcomes inevitably result.8 9 Indeed, the dissent contended that in accordance with the spirit of sovereign immunity, ordinary rules of
tort liability should apply to governmental entities.9 0 Finally,
tion of the relationship between the municipality and the plaintiff, it examined and compared the facts at bar with prior case law, which had limited municipal liability for breach
of a general statutory duty. Id. at 190-91, 447 N.E.2d at 35-36, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 487-88; see
Sanchez v. Village of Liberty, 42 N.Y.2d 876, 878, 366 N.E.2d 870, 871, 397 N.Y.S.2d 782,
783 (1977) (regulations for multiple dwellings intended to benefit the public at large);
Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 137, 204 N.E.2d 635, 635-36, 256 N.Y.S.2d
595, 596 (1965) (fire captain's failure to enforce multiple residence law did not establish
liability since the statute's intent is to benefit the general public); Steitz v. City of Beacon,
295 N.Y. 51, 55, 64 N.E.2d 704, 706 (1945) (city charter provisions requiring the establishment of a fire department are designed "to secure the benefits of well ordered municipal
government enjoyed by all as members of the community"); see also Messineo v. City of
Amsterdam, 17 N.Y.2d 523, 524-25, 215 N.E.2d 163, 163, 267 N.Y.S.2d 905, 905 (1966) (fire
department's failure to extinguish fire does not constitute valid cause of action). See generally H.R. Moch Co. v.. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 168, 159 N.E. 896, 899 (1928)
("liability would be unduly and . . . indefinitely extended"); Comment, supra note 68, at
1424 (courts and legislatures have acknowledged limits to the abolition of state and municipal immunity).
88 The Court distinguished the case from the earlier decision of Smullen v. City of New
York, 28 N.Y.2d 66, 268 N.E.2d 763, 320 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1971), noting that the imposition of
liability in that case resulted from the inspector's direct supervision of the defendant at the
time the plaintiff was injured, id. at 72, 268 N.E.2d at 767, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 24. In conclusion, the Court likened the gas regulations to the building regulations in Sanchez, and determined that although designed in part to protect against personal injury and property
damage, the paramount intention behind enactment of the regulations was to benefit all
members of the general public. 58 N.Y.2d at 190, 447 N.E.2d at 35, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
Because this is an insufficent ground upon which to predicate liability, the Court accordingly reversed the decision. Id. at 192, 447 N.E.2d 'at 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
87 58 N.Y.2d at 192, 447 N.E.2d at 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 488 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
88 Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the classification of plaintiffs
has created an "indefensible exception" to the traditional concept of tort law that "a plaintiff is entitled to compensation when he has been injured by the defendant's failure to observe standards of reasonable care under the circumstances." Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
-0 Id. at 194, 447 N.E.2d at 37, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge
Wachtler noted that, based upon similar concerns regarding incongruous results, the Court
recently overruled the distinction between invitees, licensees and trespassers in suits against
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Judge Wachtler refuted the majority's contention that application
of traditional tort concepts would cause open-ended liability, arguing instead that municipalities, like corporations and individuals,
should be liable for damages only upon a finding of negligence21
Although comporting with New York precedent, 92 the
O'Connordecision preserves the "special duty" standard which has
been severely criticized for failure to redress innocent victims who
lack the judicially defined special relationship.9 3 In addition, the
arbitrary manner in which the protected classes are defined impugns the logic and consistency of the "special duty" requirement.9 4 Indeed, there is no principled way to reconcile the
negligent landowners. Id. at 192-93, 447 N.E.2d at 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 488 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting); see Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 240-41, 352 N.E.2d 868, 871-72, 386
N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68 (1976).
9 58 N.Y.2d at 194-95, 447 N.E.2d at 38, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 489-90 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge Wachtler noted several vigorous dissents by members of the Court which consistently asserted that the special duty rule acts as a peculiar exception to the waiver of
immunity statute. Id. at 193-94, 447 N.E.2d at 37, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting).
92 See Sanchez, 42 N.Y.2d at 878, 366 N.E.2d at 871, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 783; Motyka, 15
N.Y.2d at 139, 204 N.E.2d at 637, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 598; H.R. Mach, 247 N.Y. at 168, 159
N.E. at 898-99; supra note 85.
'3 The special duty rule has been subjected to extensive criticism because it imposes on
victims the financial burden of damages caused by the municipality's negligence. See Hopkins, Municipal Tort Liability in Iowa, 31 DRAKE L. REv. 855, 861 (1981-1982) ("[b]etter
the taxpayer bear the financial burden of injury than the guiltless injured party"). This
criticism is exemplified by the following comment:
True democratic principles do not countenance the doctrine that it is better that
an innocent individual should suffer a great injury without remedy than that the
community at large should be subjected to the risk of slight inconvenience ....
[T]he damage resulting from the wrongful act of the government should be distributed among the entire community ...

where it justly belongs ....

David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to Immunity from Liability or
Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 3 (1959) (quoting 120 A.L.R. 1376, 1377 (1939)).
Moreover, the legislative intent behind section 8 of the Court of Claims Act has been
interpreted to require that no wronged individual be forced to bear his loss alone. See Note,
Tort Liability of Municipal Corporationsin New York, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 84, 87 (1943).
Thus, in light of this interpretation, it has been argued that the person or group whose
performance caused the damage should assume the responsibility of making the victim
whole. See id.; cf. Jackson v. State, 261 N.Y. 134, 138, 184 N.E. 735, 736 (1933) (discussing
state's moral duty to recompense victims of the former's negligence).
" See 18 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 66, § 53.04b, at 128. The special/public duty distinction has been attacked as illogical and inconsistent, and has been subjected to the same
criticism that resulted from the abrogation of the government/proprietary distinction. Id.;
see, e.g., Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129, 135-36 (1924) (citing
Young v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 126 Mo. App. 1, 103 S.W. 135 (1907)). One commentator,
pointing to the lack of a justifiable basis for this exception to the waiver of immunity statute, has charged that New York courts are quick to find that no duty is owed to a particular
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O'Connor holding with Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,95 a decision
rendered by the Court on the same day. In Garrett,actions were
brought against the Town of Greece and others for damages arising
out of a motel fire."6 The complaint alleged that the town had
failed to enforce certain safety and fire regulations applicable to
the motel, and failed to conduct an adequate inspection of the
building.9 7 The appellate division held that since the plaintiff alleged only a violation of a general duty owed to the public, no liability could be imposed upon the town.98 Notwithstanding this appraisal of the town's liability to the plaintiff, the Garrett Court
declared that the remaining defendants could implead the Town of
Greece for contribution, on the theory that the town had issued a
certificate of occupancy improperly, and thus had breached its
duty to the defendants by allowing alterations to the motel which
did not comply with applicable regulations.9 9 Affirming, the Court
of Appeals allowed the impleader action, reasoning that the town
had breached its duty to use reasonable care by issuing a certificate of occupancy after failing to discover fire and safety violations
at the inspection.10 0 The Garrett Court found the building owners
plaintiff. Antieau, supra note 66, at 371. Professor Antieau has criticized the policy of differentiating among plaintiffs, stating that the courts are "luxuriating in nightmares [they have]
no right to entertain once [they have] abdicated any responsibility for justly demarcating
municipal responsibility in tort." Id. at 372.
90 58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1983).
Id. at 256-57, 447 N.E.2d at 718-19, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 775-76. Among the named defendants were Holiday Inns, Inc., the corporation that built the motel, the Town of Greece,
and the present and previous owners of the motel. Id.
See Garrett v. Town of Greece, 78 App. Div. 2d 773, 773, 433 N.Y.S.2d 637, 637 (4th
Dep't 1980), aff'd mem., 55 N.Y.2d 774, 431 N.E.2d 971, 447 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1981).
98 Id. at 774, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
9 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779. In determining that an
impleader action may properly be maintained by Holiday Inns against the town, the Court
of Appeals relied primarily on Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413
N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978). In Nolechek, a child was killed while riding his motorcycle on the
defendant's property. Id. at 337, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343. A negligence suit
was instituted against the landowner by the child's father predicated on the presence of a
dangerous condition on the property, and the landowner counterclaimed, arguing that the
father had negligently entrusted his child with a dangerous instrument. Id. at 335-36, 385
N.E.2d at 1270, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 342. The Nolechek Court held that although no direct
action could be maintained by the son against the father, the landowner was not precluded
from seeking contribution from him. Id. at 336, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
Thus, the holding departed from the general tort principle that joint liability must be predicated on a duty owed directly to the plaintiff. See id. at 339-40, 385 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 345.
"0 Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 262-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. To
establish the town's liability to the motel owners, the Garrett Court posited that the town
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to be among those benefited by the regulations, and thus held that
the motel owners' reliance on the regulation was a proper basis on
which to predicate the town's liability. 1 '
While Garrett appears to establish a special duty owed by the
City to a building owner, O'Connor creates no such relationship
with the building's occupants.102 It is evident that the Garrett decision contradicts the O'Connor determination that the inspection
regulations are for the benefit of the general public.103 It is sug-

gested that the inclusion of owners and the exclusion of occupants
within the protected class is a distinction which renders the general/special duty dichotomy sterile.
It is clear that the courts have employed the "special duty"
standard as a vehicle for limiting municipal liability.0 ' Notwithhas a duty to use reasonable care when issuing occupancy certificates after inspections. Id.
By virtue of this duty, the Court held that the motel owners were justified in relying on the
town's assessment of the building's safety. Id. The town's liability "may also properly include the economic damages [that the motel owners] may suffer as a result of judgment
against them in favor of the motel guests." Id. at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at
779.
101 Id. at 262-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79.
202 O'Connor,58 N.Y.2d at 192, 447 N.E.2d at 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 488. The Court further disavowed the existence of the requisite special relationship between the city and the
injured parties by concluding.
[I]t has long been the rule in this State that, in the absence of some special relationship creating a duty to exercise care for the benefit of particular individuals,
liability may not be imposed on a municipality for failure to enforce a statute or
regulation. No such special relationship exists here.
Id.
J02 Compare Garrett,58 N.Y.2d 253, 262-63, 447 N.E.2d 717, 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774,
778-79 (1983) (recognizing a duty of reasonable care owed by a municipality to building
owners issuing occupancy certificates) with O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184,
192, 447 N.E.2d 33, 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485, 488 (1983) (denying existence of a duty owed to
specific citizens by municipal building inspectors). The O'Connor rationale rests indisputably on the Court's determination that the inspection regulation is intended to benefit the
general public, and not a special class of plaintiffs. O'Connor,58 N.Y.2d at 190, 447 N.E.2d
at 35, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 487. This distinction is the dispositive factor in establishing the existence of a special relationship between the litigants. See supra note 67. However, in establishing a relationship between the town and the motel owners, the Garrett Court expressly
found that the regulations were intended to benefit the building owner. See Garrett, 58
N.Y.2d at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. Thus, the Court has rendered
two different interpretations of similar regulations, which lend credence to the criticism that
courts often mold facts into a formula that lacks a sound basis in reason or policy. See
Borchard, supra note 94, at 129; see also Garrett,58 N.Y.2d at 266, 447 N.E.2d at 724, 460
N.Y.S.2d at 781 (Jasen, J., dissenting in part).
104 See supra note 67. An examination of case law indicates that when applying this
standard, different determinations often result even in seemingly indistinguishable situations. Compare Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 178, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485, 49091 (2d Dep't 1953) (per curiam) (city held liable) and Smullen v. City of New York, 28
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standing this objective, however, and in accordance with Garrett,a
successful impleader action will impose liability on the city to the
full extent of its negligence. 105 Moreover, the practical result of
Garrett is to afford plaintiffs an indirect cause of action against
N.Y.2d 66, 70-73, 268 N.E.2d 763, 765-67, 320 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21-24 (city liable) (1971) with
Sanchez v. Village of Liberty, 42 N.Y.2d 876, 877-78, 366 N.E.2d 870, 871, 397 N.Y.S.2d 782,
783 (1977) (village held not liable) and Whitney v. City of New York, 27 App. Div. 2d 528,
529, 275 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam) (city held not liable).
In Runkel, an action was brought against the city and the owners of an abandoned
building on behalf of children injured while playing in the building. 282 App. Div. at 174-75,
123 N.Y.S.2d at 487. Although the building had recently been inspected and found to be
unsafe, no action was taken to remedy the dangerous condition. Id. at 175-76, 123 N.Y.S.2d
at 487-88. Using the "special duty" analysis, the court held that the children were within
the class intended to receive the protection of the inspection regulation. Id. at 177-78, 123
N.Y.S.2d at 490-91. Indeed, no mention of the city's duty to the owner was mentioned.
In Smullen, the decendent was killed while descending into an improperly shored
trench. 28 N.Y.2d at 68, 268 N.E.2d at 764, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 20. A city inspector, who was
present at the time, had assured the decedent that the trench was safe. Id. at 68-69, 268
N.E.2d at 764, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 20. The city was found liable for the inspector's negligence
since regulations required the walls to be shored. Id. at 71-73, 268 N.E.2d at 766-67, 320
N.Y.S.2d at 23-25. Notably, the Smullen Court has been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the inspector's presence and approval as justifying liability. See Loyola Comment,
supra note 68, at 476. It has been argued that the Smullen distinction is arbitrary and
inappropriate, since an inspector's authorization implicitly represents that the building is
free from the particular hazard. Id.
Sanchez involved an action against the city for failure to enforce certain fire and safety
regulations. 49 App. Div. 2d 507, 508-09, 375 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (3d Dep't 1975), modified,
42 N.Y.2d 876, 366 N.E.2d 870, 397 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1977). As a result, many occupants of a
motel were killed in a fire. Id. The Court of Appeals dismissed the action, holding that the
applicable regulations were intended for the benefit of the general public. 42 N.Y.2d at 878,
366 N.E.2d at 871, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
Finally, in Whitney, a wrongful death action was brought against the city for negligently failing to inspect a boiler which subsequently exploded. 27 App. Div. 2d at 529, 275
N.Y.S.2d at 784. The court dismissed the complaint, determining that the inspection regulation was enacted for "the benefit of the common good." Id. at 529, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
It has been suggested that the outcomes in these cases were affected by the size of the
potential liability. See Loyola Comment, supra note 68, at 475. For example, in Runkel, the
building involved was not a public one, and the class of prospective litigants was small. See
id. at 474. Similarly, in Smullen, liability was limited to only one plaintiff, and was conditioned on the facts peculiar to the case. See id. at 476. Finally, Sanchez, which involved a
public motel, could easily subject a municipality to extensive liability, since the potential
number of litigants could be quite high. See id. at 474. It is suggested that although
Whitney involved a private building, the case was decided with extreme caution, because of
the presence of boilers in most public buildings.
205 See SmEEGzL § 155, at 197-98 (1978). In an impleader action, the third-party is
brought into the action by a claim instituted by the defendant. Id. If the third-party is
assessed liability, such liability may properly encompass all or part of what the defendant
may ultimately be responsible for in his action with the plaintiff. Therefore, if the city is
found to be 99% liable, and the building owner satisfies the judgment in full, the city will be
forced to compensate the owner to the extent of the city's percentage of liability.
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the city if the owner is found even fractionally liable. Pursuant to
O'Connor, however, if no liability is assessed against the building
owner, plaintiffs will be completely precluded from recovery
against the city."'6 It is submitted that no logical rationale can support this inequitable outcome. More importantly it is suggested
that as concurrent decisions, O'Connor and Garrett have frustrated this area of the law and have rendered prospective liability
unpredictable.
Although the courts consistently assert that abrogation of the
special duty rule lies within the legislative domain, they should be
mindful that the judiciary was the exponent of this rule. Indeed, it
is hoped that the Court will exercise its rightful role and rectify
the inconsistencies plaguing the law of municipal liability.
Jill A. Abramow

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 270.25: Unrestricted use of peremptory challenges held
constitutional if venire consists of a representative cross section
of community
The peremptory challenge10 7 enables litigants to remove pro-

106 Under Garrett,a plaintiff may bring a suit against the owner of a building or premises upon which the negligent event occurred. If that party is found liable to any degree he
may properly implead the city and satisfy the plaintiff's judgment against him through contribution from the city. See SIEGEL § 169, at 209.

An important aspect of impleader actions is the outcome of the independent suit between the plaintiff and the original defendant. If no liability can be assessed against the
defendant in the suit brought by the plaintiff, then the impleader action must fail irrespective of the third party's liability. With these principles in mind, the effect of Garrett may be
summarized as follows. If the owner is found to be 1% liable, and the city 99% or any
fraction thereof, the owner may implead the city for contribution and receive a percentage
of the judgment. However, if the city is found to be 100% liable, no impleader action will lie
because liability cannot be assessed against the owner. Thus, plaintiffs will be completely
precluded from recovery.
107 Challenges are available during jury selection to enable both prosecutors and defense counsel to screen out jurors who may be prejudiced against either position. J. VAN
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 139 (1977). Either party may use "challenges for cause"

without limit to screen out openly biased jurors, provided the court is satisfied that the juror
is biased. Id. at 140. "Peremptory challenges," however, since they are not subject to control
by the court, may be utilized to screen out jurors for no apparent reason; that is, it is not
necessary for the attorney to show any biases harbored by the juror. Id. at 139-40. Prosecutors enjoyed unlimited use of peremptory challenges at common law. Id. at 147. In 1305, the
English Parliament curtailed the use of peremptory challenges by the Crown, but sustained

